The Gaggle Book Club: "The Affirmative Action Empire" by Terry Martin
Each week, the Gaggle Book Club recommends a book for Gagglers to read and—most important—uploads a pdf version of it.
Our practice is that we do not vouch for the reliability or accuracy of any book we recommend. Still less, do we necessarily agree with a recommended book's central arguments. However, any book we recommend will be of undoubted interest and intellectual importance.
Today's book club selection is "The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939," by Terry Martin. Published in 2001, the book is a major study of Soviet nationality policy in the interwar period. Martin challenges conventional view that the Soviet Union was the continuation of the Russian empire. To the contrary: he argues that the Soviet leaders implemented policies that actively promoted the cultural and political development of the non-Russian nationalities. Hence Martin's nomenclature: "the world's first affirmative action state."
According to Martin, the early Soviet state, sought to institutionalize and promote non-Russian national identities rather than suppress them. The Bolsheviks believed nationalism was a necessary transitional stage before reaching a communist, internationalist society. The goal was to modernize, educate and politically mobilize non-Russian ethnic groups while simultaneously fostering a Soviet identity.
Most important: early Soviet policies were designed not only to promote non-Russian national identities but also actively to downgrade Russian nationalism. This was part of the broader Bolshevik strategy to undermine traditional imperial structures and prevent any one ethnic group—especially the Russians—from dominating the new Soviet state. Martin emphasizes that Lenin and other early Bolshevik leaders saw Russian nationalism as a dangerous, reactionary force that could undermine their vision of a multiethnic, socialist state.
Since the Russian Empire had been dominated by ethnic Russians, there was a strong push to break Russian nationalist dominance and prevent a resurgence of Russian imperial thinking. In the Bolshevik worldview, nationalism was seen as a transitional stage on the way to international communism.
However, the Bolsheviks made a distinction: Non-Russian nationalism (Ukrainian, Georgian, Kazakh, etc.) was seen as potentially progressive, because it helped break the hold of Russian imperial rule. Russian nationalism, on the other hand, was seen as reactionary, since it was supposedly tied to Tsarist imperialism.
The Bolsheviks feared that Russian dominance would alienate non-Russian populations and push them toward anti-Soviet nationalist movements.
The korenizatsiya (nativization) policy aimed to promote local languages, cultures and elites in the non-Russian republics. National languages were made official in government and education. Indigenous elites were trained and placed in administrative positions, replacing Russian officials.
New republics, autonomous regions and ethnic-based territorial units were established, reinforcing the Soviet Union’s multiethnic structure.
Martin documents how the Soviet government deliberately weakened Russian cultural and political dominance during the korenizatsiya period. For example, Russian was not made the mandatory state language in the 1920s; local languages were promoted instead. There were explicit propaganda campaigns against "Great Russian chauvinism," which was seen as a threat to socialist unity.
Martin argues that, in a way, the USSR functioned as a kind of "anti-Russian Empire"—it was built on the ruins of the Tsarist system but was designed to prevent Russian ethnic dominance over other nationalities. The goal was to create a new supranational Soviet identity that would eventually replace both Russian and non-Russian nationalism.
To be sure, by the mid-1930s, Stalin moved away from indigenization policies and re-centralized power. While the Soviet Union remained officially multinational, the Russian language and culture regained dominance. The purges of the late 1930s disproportionately targeted non-Russian elites, reversing earlier affirmative action policies. The Soviet state increasingly promoted the Russian language as the common language of the USSR. Russian cultural and historical achievements were celebrated more openly. During the Great Patriotic War, Stalin fully embraced Russian nationalism as a unifying force.
Martin convincingly argues that the early Soviet state was actively anti-Russian nationalist in its policies, aiming to dismantle alleged Russian imperial dominance and promote local national identities. Save for the brief late-Stalin period, the USSR remained committed to an anti-Russia nationalist policy.
Khrushchev encouraged greater use of local languages in education and administration. Under Khrushchev and his successors non-Russians were increasingly promoted to leadership positions within the republics. Unlike Stalin, who had allowed some level of Russian Orthodox Church activity (especially during WWII), Khrushchev intensified anti-religious campaigns, shutting down churches and religious institutions across the USSR—including in Russia itself. By the late Brezhnev era, nationalism in the republics was growing, and the Kremlin did little to discourage it.
Martin's book is a fascinating account of how a rabidly anti-Russian group too over in Russia and set about dismantling the Russian language, culture, history and traditions. There's a lesson there somewhere.