Each week, the Gaggle Book Club recommends a book for Gagglers to read and—most important—uploads a pdf version of it.

Our practice is that we do not vouch for the reliability or accuracy of any book we recommend. Still less, do we necessarily agree with a recommended book's central arguments. However, any book we recommend will be of undoubted interest and intellectual importance.

In the spirit of symbiosis, and in light of French President Emmanuel Macron's extraordinary anti-Russia tirade the other day, today's book club selection is Dominic Lieven’s "Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace." Published in 2010, Lieven's book is a deeply researched military and political history of Russia’s war against Napoleonic France, focusing not only on the 1812 campaign but also on the often-overlooked 1813–1814 campaigns that led to the final defeat of Napoleon.

The book challenges many traditional Western narratives by shifting the perspective to Russia, arguing that the victory over Napoleon was not simply the result of the harsh Russian winter or French logistical failures but the result of superior Russian strategy, diplomacy and state organization.

Lieven argues that Russia’s victory in 1812 was not merely defensive luck--Russia's Arctic winter, Russia's scorched earth tactics, Napoleon's overweening arrogance, French logistical failures--but the result of brilliantly-organized strategic retreats, disciplined military planning and a well-coordinated state effort. The real achievement came in 1813–1814, when Russia took the offensive and crushed Napoleon’s armies in the battle of Leipzig and the campaign in France.

Traditional Western narratives invariably depict Russia's army as backward, disorganized and dependent on sheer numbers. Lieven challenges this, showing that Russian officers were well-trained intelligent strategists, and capable of coordinated large-scale campaigns. Russia's military logistics, intelligence and leadership were superior to those of the French. Tsar Alexander I played a crucial and underestimated role in shaping the war and its aftermath, ensuring that Russia emerged as the leading power in Europe after 1815.

According to Lieven, the September 1812 Battle of Borodino was not a crushing Russian defeat but a calculated stand that allowed the Russians to conserve forces. Similarly, Moscow’s burning and the eventual French retreat were not acts of desperation, but part of a broader, organized Russian war effort.

Lieven doesn't only focus on Russia's 1812 victory over Napoleon. Instead, he details Russia's military triumphs of 1813 and 1814. Russia rebuilt its army rapidly, played a crucial diplomatic role in bringing Austria and Prussia into the war, and won decisive battles, such as Leipzig (1813), which shattered Napoleon’s grip on Germany. Throughout, Russia maintained logistical superiority, which allowed it to keep advancing while Napoleon struggled to maintain supply lines.

Lieven reminds readers that Napoleon could have recovered and retained power in France but for Russia’s sustained military pressure during the years 1813-14. Russia's army marched into France in 1814 and, unlike Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, the Russian-led coalition’s advance was well-organized and demonstrated superior logistics and intelligence. Tsar Alexander I personally led the campaign, playing a pivotal role in securing Paris in March 1814.

Lieven’s work challenges Western-centric narratives that focus primarily on Napoleon’s greatness as a military leader, while downplaying his mistakes.
Lieven's book differs also from conventional accounts in discounting the importance of Russia's cold winter and the scorched-earth tactics as contributing factors to Napoleon's defeat. Lieven, unlike most historians also emphasizes that Russia's war against Napoleon didn't end in 1812, but continued though to 1814. At the Potsdam conference in 1945, Stalin was asked how he felt about marching into Berlin. Stalin replied, "That's nothing. Tsar Alexander I got to Paris."

Lieven's book challenges traditional Western narratives about the Napoleonic Wars. It argues that Russia’s victory was not an accident but the result of intelligent leadership, superior logistics and a sophisticated war effort. By shifting the focus away from Napoleon and toward Russia’s role in his defeat, Lieven provides a much-needed reassessment of a critical moment in modern European history.